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"A major problem with victory as a goal is that it's an emotion-laden word because we cannot measure the value of war aims or judge the cost of their attainment. It is difficult to perceive the point at which the cost of fighting exceeds the value of victory." **Strategy** USMC Doctrinal Publication 1-1

"In order to do good, you may have to engage in evil." **Robert McNamara**

"As in all battles the dead and wounded came chiefly from the best and the bravest." **Field Marshall Lord Craver,** El Alamein, 1962

"When a country leaves a war before achieving victory it is not called leaving. It is called defeat. When the decent leave, the indecent win." **Dennis Prager**, radio talk show host

At the present time we do not have a speaker scheduled for our next meeting. It has been very difficult for our XO to even contact people who would return his calls. Also, our XO will be leaving the Company at the end of his term as his other interests have demanded more of his time. Thanks Doug for doing a demanding job well.

MEETINGS *take place the second Monday of every month at the* ***Downtown Holiday Inn,*** *310 Pearl NW, Grand Rapids, MI 49504 (616) 235-7611. Socializing begins at 6:00 (1800 hrs), dinner at 7:00 (1900 hrs), business meeting 7:15 (1915 hrs), and program at 8:00 (2000 hrs).* Ample free parking available

NOTES

With our OPEN MESS being cancelled this year there still are many ways to honor our veterans. This Sunday, 11/7, at 11:20 AM, St. Stephen Parish (Rosewood and Franklin SE) will have its yearly ceremony at their WWII memorial. Everyone is welcomed to attend, Refreshments offered after the ceremony,

Remembrance Day

Powerful.. Joshua Dyer (aged 14) was tasked at school to write a poem for Remembrance Day. An hour later (without any help) he produced this:

ONE THOUSAND MEN ARE WALKING

One thousand men are walking
Walking side by side
Singing songs from home
The spirit as their guide
they walk toward the light
milord
they walk towards the sun
they smoke and laugh and
smile together
no foes to outrun
these men live on forever
in the hearts of those they
saved
a nation truly grateful
for the path of peace they
paved
they march as friends and
comrades
but they do not march for
war
step closer to salvation
a tranquil steady corps
the meadows lit with golden
beams
a beacon for the brave
the emerald grass
untrampled
a reward for what they gave
they dream of those they left
behind
and know they dream of
them
forever in those poppy fields
there walks one thousand
men
Joshua Dyer 2019 (aged 14)



Duane E. Dewey, Medal of Honor recipient with ‘a body of steel,’ dies at 89

Duane E. Dewey, who received the Medal of Honor for smothering a grenade with his body to save fellow Marines during the Korean War, and whose recovery from grievous injuries led President Dwight D. Eisenhower to quip, “You must have a body of steel,” died Oct. 11 at a nursing home in St. Augustine, Fla. He was 89. Only three Medal of Honor recipients survive from the Korean War. The fighting that nearly ended Mr. Dewey’s life began around midnight on April 16, 1952, when a grenade whizzed over his foxhole just as he ducked down to light a cigarette. Then came a second grenade, followed by an eruption of gunfire that would last until morning. As Mr. Dewey later put it, “All hell broke loose.”



Mr. Dewey, a 20-year-old Marine corporal who had grown up in the farmland of western Michigan, was defending an outpost near Panmunjom, a Korean village along the 38th parallel where military leaders would sign an armistice the next year. He soon realized that he and his 80-man unit of the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, 1st Marine Division were far outnumbered, facing perhaps 700 Chinese soldiers.

Taking charge of his machine gun squad, he unleashed a continuous barrage of fire, prompting a comrade to warn that he might burn out the barrel. When his unit was ordered to pull back and tighten its perimeter, he located a large rock that offered some cover, and continued directing fire before running off to search for ammunition. He had just returned when a grenade detonated behind his left heel, launching shrapnel into his left leg and buttocks and sending him to the ground. A hospital corpsman arrived to examine the wounds, and was taking off Mr. Dewey’s bloody pants when another grenade rolled next to them.

Mr. Dewey later recalled that his first impulse was to throw the grenade away to save himself and his men, including an assistant gunner who was also being treated for injuries. But he was lying flat on his back, and worried he wouldn’t be able to throw the grenade far enough. According to the Medal of Honor citation, he “pulled the corpsman to the ground and, shouting a warning to the other Marines around him, bravely smothered the deadly missile with his body, personally absorbing the full force of the explosion to save his comrades from possible injury or death.”

Mr. Dewey was evacuated to a bunker full of wounded men, where he received a shot of morphine and spent the rest of the night wondering if he would bleed out or be shot by Chinese troops. American forces held out, and he was sent to a field hospital at daybreak, where doctors discovered

that he had also taken a bullet in the stomach. He received a Purple Heart and spent more than four months in military hospitals.

Awarding the Medal of Honor to Mr. Dewey in a White House ceremony on March 12, 1953, Eisenhower noted his "body of steel," then added that if the grenade "had been one of ours, it would have blown you to pieces." Mr. Dewey agreed. He often noted that he had been lucky to survive the blast, which "put a good-size hole" in his hip but missed his spine, and recalled that while he was bleeding in the bunker, he thought only of his wife, Bertha, and his infant daughter, who was born after he left for Korea. "I didn't pray for myself," he told the *Muskegon Chronicle* in 2006. "I prayed to God that she'd (Bertha) find a nice husband … that she'd find a good father for our baby."

Duane Edgar Dewey was born in Grand Rapids, Mich., on Nov. 16, 1931, and grew up on a farm outside Kalkaska, Mich. His father struggled to find work before getting a job at a foundry in Muskegon, where Mr. Dewey went to high school. He dropped out at age 16 to live with relatives in South Haven, 60 miles to the south, where he worked at a farm and foundry before joining the Marines in March 1951.

Mr. Dewey arrived in Korea that October and was discharged from the Marines the next year. Returning home to South Haven after receiving the Medal of Honor, he received a new, fully furnished three-bedroom home, built and donated by the community. He later worked at a piano factory, drove a school bus and ran his own office-machine repair shop before retiring in 1973, splitting his time between Michigan and Florida.

His wife of 68 years, the former Bertha Bierhalter, died in 2020. Survivors include two children, Arline Broome of South Haven and Dwight Dewey of Durham, N.C.; two grandsons; and four great-grandchildren. Mr. Dewey often spoke at veterans events, traveling at times to conferences hosted by the Congressional Medal of Honor Society. Getting the award "means a lot to me," he said in the 2011 video, before adding that each time he put it on he also thought about comrades who deserved the honor but never received it. "I didn't do anything that somebody else in my position wouldn't have done," he said. On the left is Mr. Dewey in 2011.

The Canon Report thanks member Jay Stone for making us aware of a local hero.

Be Careful What You Wish For

The True Lessons of the Afghan War

Disagreements over how to assess the American exodus from Afghanistan have kept the pundits busy these last weeks, even though there wasn't much to say that hadn't been said before. For some of them, however, that was irrelevant. Having overseen or promoted the failed Afghan War themselves, all the while brandishing various "metrics" of success, they were engaged in transparent reputation-salvaging. Not surprisingly, the entire spectacle has been tiresome and unproductive. Better to devote time and energy to distilling the Afghan war's larger lessons. Here are four worth considering.

Lesson One: When You Make Policy, Give Serious Thought to Possible Unintended Consequences

The architects of American policy toward Afghanistan since the late 1970s bear responsibility for the disasters that occurred there because they couldn't, or wouldn't, look beyond their noses. As a result, their policies backfired with drastic consequences. Some historical scene-setting is required to understand just why and how.

Let's start in another country and another time. Consider the December 1979 decision of the leadership of the Soviet Union to send in the Red Army to save the ruling Marxist and pro-Soviet People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Having seized control of that country the previous year, the PDPA was soon pleading for help. By centralizing its power in the Afghan capital, Kabul (never a good way to govern that land), and seeking to modernize society at breakneck speed — through, among other things, promoting the education and advancement of women — it had provoked an Islamic insurgency that spread rapidly. Once Soviet troops joined the fray, the United States, assisted by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, and even China, would start funding, arming, and training the *mujahedeen*, a collection of Islamist groups committed to waging jihad there.

The decision to arm them set the stage for much of what happened in Afghanistan ever since, especially because Washington gave Pakistan carte blanche to decide which of the jihadist groups would be armed, leaving that country's powerful Inter-Services Intelligence Agency to call the shots. The ISI favored the most radical mujahedeen groups, calculating that an Islamist-ruled Afghanistan would provide Pakistan with "strategic depth" by ending India's influence there. India did indeed have close ties with the PDPA, as well as the previous government of Mohammed Daoud, who had overthrown King Zahir Shah, his cousin, in 1973. Pakistan's Islamist parties, especially the *Jama'at-i-Islami,* which had been proselytizing among the millions of Afghan refugees then in Pakistan, along with the most fundamentalist of the exiled Afghan Islamist groups, also helped recruit fighters for the war against the Soviet troops.

From 1980 until 1989, when the defeated Red Army finally departed from Afghanistan, Washington's foreign policy crew focused in a single-minded fashion on expelling them by arming those anti-Soviet insurgents. One rationale for this was a ludicrous theory that the Soviet move into Afghanistan was an initial step toward Moscow's ultimate goal: conquering the oil-rich Persian Gulf. The spinners of this apocalyptic fantasy, notably President Jimmy Carter's hawkish national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, seemed not to have even bothered to peruse a map of the terrain between Afghanistan and the Gulf. It would have shown that among the obstacles awaiting Russian forces headed there was the 900-mile-long, 14,000-foot-high Zagros mountain range.

Enmeshed in a Cold War-driven frenzy and eager to stick it to the Soviets, Brzezinski and others of like mind gave no thought to a critical question: What would happen if the Soviets were finally expelled and the mujahedeen gained control of Afghanistan? That lapse in judgment and lack of

foresight was just the beginning of what proved to be a chain of mistakes. Though the PDPA government outlasted the Red Army's retreat, the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991 proved a death sentence for its Afghan allies. Instead of forming a unity government, however, the mujahedeen promptly turned on one another. There ensued a vicious civil war, pitting Pashtun *mujahedeen* groups against their Tajik and Uzbek counterparts, with Kabul as the prize. The fighting destroyed large parts of that city's western and southern neighborhoods, killing as many as 25,000 civilians, and forcing 500,000 of them, nearly a third of the population, to flee. So wearied were Afghans by the chaos and bloodletting that many were relieved when the Taliban, themselves former participants in the anti-Soviet jihad, emerged in 1994, established themselves in Kabul in 1996, and pledged to reestablish order.

Some of the Taliban and Taliban-allied leaders who would later make the United States' most-wanted list had, in fact, been bankrolled by the CIA to fight the Red Army, including Jalaluddin Haqqani, founder of the now-infamous Haqqani Network, and the notoriously cruel Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of the *Hezb-e-Islami*, arguably the most extreme of the mujahedeen groups, who is now negotiating with the Taliban, perhaps angling for a spot in its new government.

Osama Bin Laden's links with Afghanistan can also be traced to the anti-Soviet war. He achieved his fame thanks to his role in that American-backed jihad and, along with other Arabs involved in it, founded al-Qaeda in 1988. Later, he decamped to Sudan, but after American officials demanded his expulsion, moved, in 1996, back to Afghanistan, a natural haven given his renown there.

Though the Taliban, unlike al-Qaeda, never had a transnational Islamist agenda, they couldn't deny him succor — and not just because of his cachet. A main tenet of Pashtunwali, the Pashtun social code they lived by, was the duty to provide refuge (*nanawati*) to those seeking it. Mullah Mohammad Omar, the Taliban's supreme leader, became increasingly perturbed by Bin Laden's incendiary messages proclaiming it "an individual duty for every Muslim" to kill Americans, including civilians, and personally implored him to stop, but to no avail. The Taliban were stuck with him.

Now, fast forward a couple of decades. American leaders certainly didn't create the Islamic State-Khorasan Province — aka IS-K, an affiliate of the main Islamic State — whose suicide bombers killed 170 people at Kabul airport on August 26th, 13 of them American troops. Yet IS-K and its parent body emerged partly from the ideological evolution of various extremists, including many Taliban commanders, who had fought the Soviets. Later, inspired, especially after the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, to continue the jihad, they yearned for something bolder and more ambitious than the Taliban's version, which was confined to Afghanistan.

It should hardly have required clairvoyance in the 1980s to grasp that funding an anti-Soviet Islamist insurgency might have dangerous long-term consequences. After all, the *mujahedeen* were hardly secretive about the sort of political system and society they envisaged for their country.

Lesson Two: Beware the Overwhelming Pride Produced by the Possession of Unrivaled Global Power

The idea that the U.S. could topple the Taliban and create a new state and society in Afghanistan was outlandish considering that country's history. But after the Soviet Union started to wobble and eventually collapsed and the Cold War was won, Washington was giddy with optimism. Recall the paeans in those years to "the unipolar moment" and "the end of history." We were Number One, which meant that the possibilities, including remaking entire countries, were limitless.

The response to the 9/11 attacks then wasn't simply a matter of shock and fear. Only one person in Washington urged reflection and humility in that moment. On September 14, 2001, as Congress prepared to authorize a war against al-Qaeda and its allies (the Taliban), Representative

Barbara Lee (D-CA) gave a prescient speech. "I know," she said, "this resolution will pass, although we all know that the president can wage a war even without it. However… let's step back for a moment… and think through the implications of our actions today, so that this does not spiral out of control."

In the heat of that moment, in a country that had become a military power beyond compare, no one cared to consider alternative responses to the al-Qaeda attacks. Lee's would be the lone no vote against that Authorization to Use Military Force. Afterward, she would receive hate mail, even death threats. So confident was Washington that it rejected the Taliban's offer to discuss surrendering Bin Laden to a third country if the U.S. stopped the bombing and provided proof of his responsibility for 9/11. Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld also refused to consider the Taliban's leadership attempts to negotiate a surrender and amnesty. The Bush administration treated the Taliban and al-Qaeda as identical and excluded the former from the December 2001 Bonn talks it had convened to form a new Afghan government. As it happened, the Taliban, never having received the memo from various eminences who pronounced it dead, soon regrouped and revved up its insurgency.

The United States then faced two choices, neither of them good. Its top officials could have decided that the government they had created in Kabul wouldn't survive and simply withdrawn their forces. Or they could have stuck with nation-building and periodically "surged" troops into the country in hopes that a viable government and army would eventually emerge. They chose the latter. No president or senior military commander wanted to be blamed for "losing" Afghanistan or the "war on terror," so the baton was passed from one commander to the next and one administration to another, each claiming to have made significant progress. The result: a 20-year, $2.3-trillion fiasco that ended chaotically at Kabul airport.

Lesson Three: Don't Assume That Opponents Whose Values Don't Fit Yours Won't Be Supported Locally

Reporting on the Taliban's retrograde beliefs and pitiless practices helped foster the belief that such a group, itself supposedly a Pakistani creation, could be routed because Afghans reviled it. Moreover, the bulk of the dealings American officials and senior military leaders had were with educated, urbane Afghan men and women, and that strengthened their view that the Taliban lacked legitimacy while the U.S.-backed government had growing public confidence. Had the Taliban truly been a foreign transplant, however, they could never have kept fighting, dying, and recruiting new members for nearly two decades in opposition to a government and army backed by the world's sole superpower. The Taliban certainly inspired fear and committed numerous acts of brutality and horror, but poor rural Pashtuns, their social base, didn't view them as outsiders with strange beliefs and customs, but as part of the local social fabric.

Mullah Omar, the Taliban's first supreme leader, was born in Kandahar Province and raised in Uruzgun Province. His father, Moulavi Ghulam Nabi, had been respected locally for his learning. Omar became the leader of the Hotaki tribe, part of one of the two main Pashtun tribal confederacies, the Ghilzai, which was a Taliban mainstay. He joined the war against the Soviet occupation in 1979, returning to Kandahar once it ended, where he ran a madrassa, or religious school. After the Taliban took power in 1996, though its leader, he remained in Kandahar, seldom visiting the capital. The Kabul government and its American patrons may have inadvertently helped the Taliban's cause. The more that ordinary Afghans experienced the raging corruption of the American-created system and the viciousness of the paramilitary forces, militias, and warlords the U.S. military relied on, the more successful the insurgents were at portraying themselves as the country's true nationalists resisting foreign occupiers and their collaborators. Not for nothing did the Taliban liken Afghanistan's U.S.-supported presidents to Shah Shuja, an exiled Afghan monarch the invading British placed on the

throne, triggering an armed uprising that lasted from 1839 to 1842 and ended with British troops suffering a catastrophic defeat. But who needed history? Certainly not the greatest power ever.

Lesson Four: Beware the Generals, Contractors, Consultants, and Advisers Who Eternally Issue Cheery Reports From War Zones

The managers of wars and economic projects acquire a vested interest in touting their "successes" (even when they know quite well that they're actually failures). Generals worry about their professional reputations, nation-builders about losing lucrative government contracts. Senior American commanders repeatedly assured the president and Congress that the Afghan army was becoming a thoroughly professional fighting force, even when they knew better. (If you doubt this, just read the scathing analysis of retired Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Davis, who did two tours of duty in Afghanistan.)

Reporter Craig Whitlock's Afghanistan Papers — based on a trove of once-private documents as well as extensive interviews with numerous American officials — contains endless example of such happy talk. After serving 19 months leading U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan, General John Allen declared that the Afghan army could hold its own, adding that "this is what winning looks like." General John Campbell, who held the same position during the last quarter of 2015, praised those troops as a "capable" and "modern, professional force." American generals constantly talked about corners being turned.

Torrents of data were cited to tout the social and economic progress produced by American aid. It mattered not at all that reports by the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction questioned the readiness and capabilities of the Afghan army, while uncovering information about schools and hospitals funded but never built, or built but never used, or "unsafe," "literally crumbling," or saddled with unsustainable operating costs. Staggering sums of American aid were also lost to systemic corruption. U.S.-funded fuel supplies were typically stolen on a "massive scale" and sold on the black market.

Afghan commanders padded payrolls with thousands of "ghost soldiers," pocketing the cash as they often did the salaries of unpaid actual soldiers. The economic aid that American commander General David Petraeus wanted ramped up because he considered it essential to victory fueled bribe-taking by officials managing basic services. That, in turn, only added to the mistrust of the U.S.-backed government by ordinary citizens.

Have policymakers learned any lessons from the Afghan War? President Biden did declare an end to this country's "forever wars" and its nation-building (though not to its anti-terror strategy driven by drone attacks and commando raids). Real change, however, won't happen until the vast national security establishment and military-industrial complex nourished by the post-9/11 commitment to the war on terror, regime change, and nation building reaches a similar conclusion. And only a wild optimist could believe that likely.

Here, then, is the simplest lesson of all: no matter how powerful your country may be, your wishes are not necessarily the world's desires and you probably understand a lot less than you think.

The above was written by Rajan Menon, PhD on 9/14/2021. The author is a Political Science professor at the City College of New York. He is also a Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University and a Global Ethics Fellow at the Carnegie Council on Ethics in International Affairs.

The parallels, although not mentioned, with the Vietnam War are undeniable. Most disturbing is how similar our military leadership behaved during both conflicts. The complete denial of reality and the need to still throw resources into an unwindable war. Nothing was learned from our Vietnam experience, we just repeated the same mistakes; even when trying to disengage.

Reading Civil War History

The study of southern history during the war is taking what little remains and weaving it into a sensible story. Study of northern history during the war is trying to take a PH test of a vast lake and realizing that you in the end, have a sample. At the end of the war Jefferson Davis's records were set ablaze by his secretaries, and gone went much of the evidence of how the South was ruled. At the same time regiments across the south burned their records. Forts burned theirs, and if not for a quirk of luck where one general refused to allow it, the entire records of the army department and the congress would have been destroyed, instead of merely being redacted and select items removed. What was left were the writings of Southern women belonging to a category of "General's Wives" who took the honor and history of their husband very seriously. They were in the same vein as Custer's wife. In an era when they could not shine themselves, their husband and their stories became the hill upon which they built their castles to memory.

The problem these women faced, the same problem all ex-Confederates faced, was two fold. Their cause sucked, and their records were burned. So they went out and wrote their own history and did not bother with the truth, just the aggrandizement of their husbands, and thus began the process of the Lost Cause.

In North Carolina the Yadkin massacre is unknown to us except by family members because the records of the regiments involved were destroyed and North Carolina burned its state records. The massacres around Hot Springs were retained, by accident, because of letters of inquiry by the governor. The official records of the thousands of kidnapped and tortured free Blacks from the north are missing, Lee had them burned, but we have records from where some of them ended up at the infamous and brutal slave trading center in Richmond. So our first lesson for the historian of the South is that records were largely missing after the war, and the worst records, the more likely they are to be missing, which the opposite in the North. If you study the North, each execution of a soldier for stealing eggs is detailed in forty or fifty pages spread across twenty different locations, and it all survived today long after the issue of stealing eggs has left our memory.

Another reason is the Rashomon Effect. The Rashomon effect describes how parties describe an event in a different and contradictory manner, which reflects their subjective interpretation and self-interested advocacy, rather than an objective truth. Soldier interviews do little to help us understand the grand strategy of a battle, but can help us understand the personification of the combat. An historian was reading letters from Louisiana's Tiger brigade at Gettysburg and they describe a fight at the "stone wall," they tell about a melee at "cannon hill", they charged a "cemetery hill," and were forced to retreat from the hallow woods. Some of that reads well with the battle we know they fought, but some of which they wrote makes little of no sense.

Here are the reasons. Some of them are lying. Pure and simple at least one letter was from a person who there is proof he was not present with the Tigers because he was busy selling Blacks they had captured to slavers in Maryland and was having problems because of the amount of discipline they needed. It is very possible that one of the four Tiger Regiments were retasked for part of the 2nd Day to another division. In fact the historian was willing to bet this happened and it remains unknown to other historians and unable to be proven. MOST of the records of the Tiger's were destroyed at war's end to cover up what we would consider today war crimes and to avoid ill feelings in New Orleans over the execution of some popular people in the regiment. Could a regiment or part of one have been tasked to the left then run over to cemetery hill at the evening of the 2nd day? That would really explain many of the stone wall comments.

Some soldiers were not in their right mind. Fear and injury caused them to conflate their locations and what was happening, so after the battle they were talking with friends and just accepted

what was told to them. “Hey, you remember when we were hiding behind the stone wall at the bee’s nest and old Thomas got caulked?” No, he absolutely does not remember that, what the fuck was the bee’s nest? And so it goes when he writes his letter home he was at the “bee’s nest.”

The gold standard for things like “The Devil’s Den” trends to be when they get recorded in a regimental report AND that report gets countersigned by the Brigade or Division commanders and propagated through the information system. Historians in the 1870s would often call battles by their Southern names but modern historians are using Northern names because the information is higher quality. At the same time more effort has been made to tell the story of the common soldier, so we often do get soldiers stories whose narratives will vary from what we expect. Just a side note, the term the Devil’s Den was also not invented by soldiers during the fight. It was called that long before the battle.

At the end of the battle at Gettysburg, grave diggers were moving across the battlefield trying to identify and remove bodies from the field. Following them were officers, assigned to graves and record detail, photographers, and newspaper people. All of the followers noted that some places on the battlefield were a carpet of bodies spread nearly evenly for a mile or more - the field over which Pickett charged was like that. Some battlefield areas were devoid of the dead - their units had time to carry the dead back with them. And in several places the gravediggers and officers were met with horror.

The slaughter pen was not named by soldiers or officers, but its first appearance shows up written by journalists. The place they called the slaughter pen was a twenty by thirty meter section of wooded ground at the base of little round top where the bodies of union soldiers were found to be stacked by the hundreds. Many had their clothing blown off, their limbs ripped from them, were decapitated, and were shot through and two a dozen or more times. The blood soaked the ground and flesh hung from the remaining trees. Most of the men who saw the place were not new to the affects of war. What they were new to was what happened when tens of thousands of minie balls struck hundreds of humans who remained in position returning file. By the time the battlefield was being cleaned, in most places, the worst of the gore was gone, but here it looked like a pig slaughter. To understand this you have to understand how pigs were slaughtered then. They were usually grabbed from a pen and their hind legs roped, pulled up to a post and bled and disembowled. The pen would fill with blood and guts as pigs hanging in rows bled out.

To the men who saw this, it was like humans were slaughtered like pigs, then thrown back into the messy den. How do you bury an arm when two hundred men are missing theirs? Why did a foot get found lodged twenty feet in a tree? What do you do about the fingers of one man found sticking in the rips of another man? And they wrote home, “How will God ever sort out who and what belongs to whom on the final day?”

If you have ever been to the park and stood in a place called “The Devil’s Den” you are north of the place that would be called the Slaughter Pen.That is because the map is trying to show the whole day of battles. The defenders of round top were those who fell at Slaughter Pen, which is just south of the Devil’s Den (which itself got its name from before the battle because of a snake that supposedly lived in the rocks. While some of the fallen in the Slaughter Pen were Confederate, most were from the 40th New York Infantry Regiment, more than a hundred supposedly fell first defending, then charging to regain the point of land.

The Slaughter Pen and the Devils Den are north and south of each other. The Devils Den at the foot of the Little Round Top, the Slaughter Pen at the foot of Round Top. Because the Slaughter Pen did not get its name from soldiers or before the war, it is often omitted from maps, and action there is often conflated because most maps show the disposition of troops at the end of the day and not their movement during the day.