



Official Newsletter of the Michigan Company of Military Historians & Collectors
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January 10, 2021

“In peace, sons bury their fathers. In war, fathers bury their sons.” Herodotus

“No matter what they said on December 8, 1941, the blindest and the stubbornest would continue to believe that Pearl Harbor was no more than [what] America deserved for not having remained pure and isolated as such wise men had counseled.” Marquis Childs, November 2, 1942, columnist and prominent Isolationist for the St.Louis Post-Dispatch

“Don’t tell them anything. When it’s over, tell them who won.” Fleet Admiral Ernest King, Chief of Naval Operations, WWII on his plan to tell the American people about the Navy’s wartime efforts.

For the next 3 months we will meet at 11:30; Meeting begins at 12:15; Lunch served approximately 12:30; Program starts at 1:00. We have the room until 4:00 if the program runs longer or for those who wish to stay and visit after the program. Note, the bar does not open until 4:00. Menu choices will be Grilled Chicken Caesar Salad, B.L.T., or Grilled Shrimp Salad. Beverages will be coffee, tea or soft drinks. Cost \$16

MEETINGS take place the second Monday of every month at the **Downtown Holiday Inn**, 310 Pearl NW, Grand Rapids, MI 49504 (616) 235-7611. Socializing begins at 6:00 (1800 hrs), dinner at 7:00 (1900 hrs), business meeting 7:15 (1915 hrs), and program at 8:00 (2000 hrs). Ample free parking available

GENERAL STAFF
OFFICERS OF THE
COMPANY

Commandant-Susan Karbowski
 Executive Officer-Jim Henningsen
 Adjutant-Fern O'Beshaw
 Judge Advocate -Jay Stone
 Mess Officer - Mike Krushinsky
 Sgt-at-Arms - Richard Foster
 Editor Cannon Report - Kingman Davis
 Open Mess Chairman - Jay Stone
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 Archivist - Fern O'Beshaw

NOTES

New officers nominated and will assume their duties in January if no one else decides to run. They are: Commandant-Susan Karbowski and Executive Officer-Jim Henningsen. All other positions appear to remain the same.

Dues for 2022 are still only \$45.00, due at our January meeting.

We are still meeting at the Downtown Holiday Inn in the same room . Doors open at 11:30. At the present time the bar is closed until 4 PM

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Hubris Repeated

“In the years before WWII the Americans and the British had taken comfort in a widely held conviction that Japanese air power was not to be viewed seriously. That impression was nourish by quackish, pseudo-scientific theories proposed by experts in various fields. The Japanese would always make bungling pilots, authorities patiently explained because they suffer from innate physiological defects. They were cross side in nearsighted, possibly a symptom of their slanted eyes. As infants, they been carried on the backs of their mothers, causing their heads to wobble in a way that threw off the balance in the inner ear. Japanese cultural norms emphasize conformity and obedience; therefore, their young men must lack the aviators traits of individualism and self-reliance. Only after the shocking losses of December, 1941 did it begin to dawn on the Allies that they had seen only what the Japanese had wanted them to see. In fact, the Japanese naval aviators were among the very best pilots in the world. They had been selected in highly competitive recruiting programs, and earned their wings by surviving long intense training regimens. They were on average far more seasoned than their Allied counterparts. Many had flown more than 100 aerial combat missions over China since 1937, accruing an average of 500 to 600 flight hours in the cockpit. They showed resourcefulness in adaptability; they worked supremely well together; and they were ruthless in attacking any weaknesses.”

Ian W. Toll continues to write in **Pacific Crucible**: “the Mitsubishi A6M Zero was a dogfighting champion, an aerial acrobat that out-turned, out-climbed and out-maneuvered any fighter plane the Allies could send against it. It excelled in relatively low speed , low altitude tail chasing because its tight turning radius allowed it to get behind any Allied fighter plane or even to flip over on its back and kill the enemy with a short burst from above. It was armed with two 7.7 mm machine guns and two powerful wing-mounted 20mm cannons. The plane had been placed in service in the summer of 1940, almost 18 months before Pearl Harbor. Its arrival did not escape the attention of General Claire Lee Chennault commander of the Flying Tigers, an American volunteer group that fought for the Chinese Air Force. Chennault had coached the P 40 pilots on how to fight the Zero offering the same technical advice the Navy fighter jocks would later develop independently. But Chennault’s intelligence reports were simply ignored in Washington. The Americans could not bring themselves to believe that Japan could've built and manufactured a machine with a climb rate of 3000 ft./min. For a year and a half, the Zero remained almost completely unknown in Allied aviation circles, and the American and British pilots were forced to learn about this lethal athlete the hard way. It was another example of the fatal hubris of the West in the face of plentiful evidence of the Japanese threat, an attitude that would cost hundreds of planes and aircrews in the early months of the Pacific War.

A week before the war, against the recommendation of his admirals, Prime Minister Churchill had ordered a powerful naval squadron to Singapore in hopes of the deterring Japanese aggression against the colony. Force Z, as it was called was built around two of Britain’s finest and most prestigious ships of war, the battleship *Prince of Wales* and the battle cruiser *Repulse*. The fate of those ships even more than the loss of the American battleships at Pearl Harbor was to mark the turning of a new page in naval history. On December 8 local time, just hours



after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Force Z was sent to intercept and destroy a Japanese invasion force in the South China Sea. The British had no aircraft carrier in the theater and the RAF was already in disarray, so the squadron was obliged to sail without air support. The British hoped the operation would finish quickly and they could get away to the east before the Japanese could attack them.

Despite the lack of air cover, the officers and crews of the great British warships were upbeat—whatever they had heard of the shocking result of the air battles over in northern Malaya, they remained confident that the Japanese were no match for two of the best and most powerful ships of the Royal Navy. On the afternoon of December 9, a Japanese surface force was sighted by a British patrol plane, a flag officer of the *Repulse* remarked, ‘Oh, but they are Japanese. There's nothing to worry about.’ That night over dinner in the officers ward room the prevailing feeling among the men was summed up in another officer’s reply: ‘we are not overconfident we just don't think the enemy is much good. They could not beat China for five years and now look what they are doing out here, jumping all over the map instead of meeting at one or two places, they cannot be very smart to be doing that.’

At 11 AM on December 10, three waves of bombers appeared at 12,000 feet. They remained in close formation and dropped several 250 kg bombs. Turning and twisting violently, heeling sharply to starboard and port, the *Repulse* dodged all but one bomb, which struck her seaplane deck, 24 men died; but otherwise not impairing the maneuverability or defenses of the ship. About 20 minutes later radar picked up a flight of nine torpedo bomber's coming in from the west. The *Prince of Wales*, was attacked in groups of two and three at less than 100 feet. She was hit twice near the stern jamming her rudder and flooding her engine rooms. The crippled leviathan steamed helplessly in a jagged circle, flames and smoke spewing behind her into the sky.

A third attack of torpedo bombers descended on the *Repulse*. Spared in the first barrage, she maneuvered to save herself, and managed to avoid almost 20 torpedoes, but at last she was caught in an anvil attack, with torpedoes dropped simultaneously at her bow. *Repulse* was struck twice and immediately began to take on water, suddenly there was a massive explosion. Her captain ordered abandon ship, shouting, ‘you put up a good show now save yourselves.’ Men then jumped into the sea where many drowned and others treaded water for hours, their faces blackened by fuel oil. At 12:30 PM *Repulse* rolled over and sank stern first. Destroyers circled cautiously, picking up survivors. The battle claimed the lives of 47 British officers and 793 men. The Japanese, amazingly, had lost only three planes in the action.

The fate of Force Z was something new in the annals of naval war, and it settled old and bitter arguments. Though it was a Japanese victory and a painful Allied defeat, it was also a conceptual triumph within naval circles all over the world for the cause of aviation. It did more than even Pearl Harbor to undermine the power of the Mahanian "big gun club.” Fleet doctrine would be hastily rewritten, battleships would now be relegated to a support role within task forces built around aircraft carriers. Battleship anti-aircraft weaponry would be doubled, tripled, and finally quadrupled, until they were bristling with AA guns of every caliber, and better able to defend both themselves and the carriers against the enemy attack. Their huge 14 and 16 inch main batteries would be employed mainly for shore bombardment, in support of amphibious troop landings. These doctrines were swiftly adopted by the U.S. Navy and a lesser extent by the Royal Navy; but they would be slower to penetrate the upper ranks of the imperial Japanese Navy, where hopes for a decisive clash with battleships would be cherished almost to the end of the war.

Although after the war the U.S. Navy’s ‘big gun’ admirals did everything possible to maintain what they believed was the supremacy of the battleship at the expense of carrier development and the new super-weapon, the submarine. Delaying naval innovations by decades.

Basic Training

The Basic Training in the Japanese military can be characterized as “unabashed sadism.” Physical abuse of recruits, both officer and enlisted, was commonplace within the army and navy. There rationale was that it was a form of education and it did men good. The consequence of such a training regimen did exactly the opposite. Unit cohesion was sacrificed for blind obedience to ones superior. Army and navy pilots were trained under separate commands.

Initially, the Navy pilot training program was open only to officers who graduated from the Imperial Japanese Naval Academy. However, the training was extended to include non-commissioned officers in March 1914 and eventually also to enlisted navy personnel in May 1920. Over the years, the number of NCO and enlisted pilots significantly surpassed the number of commissioned officer pilots, and officers would typically only command units and lead formations in combat. As the Pacific War progressed and attrition impacted the units, it was not uncommon for NCOs to lead battle formations due to the lack of officers, and some units even ended up without officers, as in the case of 204th Air Group in summer 1943 after the debacle in the Marianas. Admiral Ozawa mustered 440 aircraft in nine flattops against Raymond Spruance with his 905 fighters, torpedo and- dive bombers from 15 carriers. Using Army fighters flying in from island bases the Americans lost 123 aircraft against over 500 Japanese fighters and bombers.

Prior to the Pacific war, the training programs were extremely selective and competitive, and produced only a small number of elite pilots every year. Graduates of the Imperial Japanese Naval Academy would first serve as midshipmen for a year before being commissioned as Ensigns. Newly commissioned Ensigns were selected for pilot training based on the aptitude test that typically lasted for three weeks with intense physical training. After that officers were selected for the flight training. They would first conduct one month of training in a two-seater aircraft with an instructor. Normally the first solo flight would take around 12-13 logged hours of dual flight time. After that they would proceed with more advanced flight training for the next several months. The whole course took about nine months, and after the completion, the graduates were assigned to a specific aircraft role (fighter, dive bomber, torpedo bomber, land-based bomber or seaplane) and were sent to various air groups for specialization. The pilots gained experience fighting in China and when Pearl Harbor was attacked most pilots had over 500 hours in combat.

However, during the Pacific War, a rapid increase of the demand for replacement pilots significantly reduced the selectiveness and training time. With the long duration of the training program, combined with a shortage of gasoline for training, the Navy was unable to rapidly provide qualified replacements in sufficient numbers. Plus pilots were never rotated back to train replacements nor were they given leave to psychologically recover. Japanese airmen flew till they died.

As difficult and grueling as aviator training was there can be no comparison to what a Japanese infantry soldier went through. Physical beatings were not only commonplace for the merest infraction but entire units were disciplined if even one member failed to achieve a satisfactory completion. Baseball bats were the typically used to instill discipline, if the recruit was injured and unable to continue he was sent back to recover and join the next class when able.

General Brooke-Popham, Commander-in-Chief Far East Command , after observing Japanese troops on the Hong Kong-China border in 1940 described them as “various subhuman specimens dressed in dirty gray uniforms. If these represent the average of the Japanese Army the problems of food accommodation would be simple. But I believe they cannot form an intelligent fighting force.” These subhumans of 1940 mutated into the superhumans of 1942. In capturing Singapore many Allied soldiers believed that the Japanese possessed preternatural senses and abilities. Like bats, they

could see in the dark. Like panthers, they could move soundlessly through the underbrush. Like ants, they could communicate with their own kind by some unspoken brainwave. They have no fear of death. They saw their enemies as being less than human and their destruction was their goal. To die in combat was a glorious goal that led to being memorialized in the *Yasukuni Shrine*.

The *Yasukuni* is a Shinto temple located in Chiyoda, Tokyo. It was founded by Emperor Meiji in June 1869 and commemorates those who died in service of Japan from the Boshin War of 1868–1869 through the First Indochina War of 1946–1954. The shrine's purpose has been expanded over the years to include those who died in the wars involving Japan.

The shrine lists the names, origins, birthdates, and places of death of 2,466,532 men, women, children, and various pet animals. Among those are 1,068 convicted war criminals, 14 of whom are A-Class (convicted of having been involved in the planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of the war). This has led to many controversies surrounding the shrine. Another memorial at the *Honden* (main hall pictured right) building commemorates anyone who died on behalf of Japan, and so includes Koreans and Taiwanese who served Japan at the time. In addition, the *Chinreisha* ("Spirit Pacifying Shrine") building is a shrine built to inter the souls of all the people who died during WWII, regardless of their nationality.



Schozo Tominaga, a young second lieutenant assigned to China 1941 recalled meeting infantry veterans he commanded “when I looked at the men of my platoon, I was stunned, they had evil eyes. They weren't human eyes, but the eyes of leopards or tigers. The longer the men have been at the front, the more evil their eyes appeared. Everyone became a demon within three months.” All enemies were demonized by the belligerents, none were excluded. But the Germans, Russians, and Japanese took it to another level. The Japanese practiced the “Three All Policy.” Burn All, Seize All, Kill All. When new soldiers were sent to China they were ordered to bayonet Chinese prisoners (not all were soldiers). Their hearts were encircled and they were instructed not to penetrate anything within that circle, thereby prolonging their lives and inflicting the greatest amount of pain. Any soldier who flinched was beaten and ordered to do it again. Beheading contests were conducted to determine who do the most before tiring. A few men could exceed 100 executions.

When the Germans invaded Russia it was planned as a war of extermination against an inferior race, the *untermensch*. The German high command issued orders that not only encouraged but actually demanded that they commit crimes against enemy soldiers, prisoners and civilians. The battles were fought from the start with an unprecedented ruthlessness and brutality on both sides. Behind the front line SS units organized systematic murder operations and the industrial extermination of the so-called enemies of the people. When the Wehrmacht retreated early in 1943 they set fire to thousands of towns and villages in the east as part of the ‘scorched earth’ policy.

From day one the Russian campaign claimed an exceptional number of losses. While an average of 2100 Germans died daily, the death toll on the Soviet side—slain soldiers, starved POWs, murdered civilians—reached more than 14,100 a day. By the end of April 1945, at least twenty million Soviet nationals had lost their lives. Now the Germans, whose towns and villages the Red Army was now rolling through with their tanks would see payback. The Russians soon got their revenge and retribution but not the Chinese. Over ten million had died and suffered under the brutal rule of the Japanese. Not even an apology was proffered as they returned to their island home, safe under the umbrella of the American military. We have yet to see and understand how the Oriental mind does not forget and is patient to the length unrealized by the Western mind.

No Innocents Anywhere

Time moves on and people's attitudes change, some minds take longer than others and some are still works in progress. The German people, for the most part, tried to ameliorate their behaviors after WWII. The Japanese, not so much. For a brief period in the 1990's there was a resurgence of an ultra-right nationalistic movement in that country. Japanese historians then began publishing accounts of the atrocities committed by their mid-20th century military and their victims started to come forth to relate their experiences. There was not a seismic shift in the attitudes of the average Japanese but there was a slight political change and the extreme nationalists soon lost some of their power.

In Germany there were a series of events that was never really discussed or revealed until recently. By the end of April 1945 the Third Reich had fallen and the invasion was nearly complete. As the Soviet army advanced, horrifying stories spread about the depravity of its soldiers. Many Germans felt there was nothing left but disgrace and despair. For tens of thousands of them it seemed the only option was to choose death—for themselves and their children. A German historian, writer and documentary film-maker Florian Huber PhD, researched public records, diaries, letters and memoirs describing the euphoria of many ordinary Germans as Hitler restored national pride. He traces their indifference to the sufferings of the Führer's political enemies, Jews and other minorities. He then follows their descent into despair as the war took its terrible toll.

In writing **“Promise Me You’ll Shoot Yourself”** (2015, English translation 2019) Florian Huber begins his account of those events with a gripping narrative set in the small Pomeranian town of Demmin, where it is estimated that more than 1,000 people perished out of a total population of 15,000, a number swollen further by thousands of refugees fleeing from areas to the east. Terrified at the approach of the Red Army, whose atrocities had already been widely reported by propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels's

media, inhabitants began the wave of suicide. Many whole families walked into one of the surrounding rivers to drown. Enraged by fierce resistance from fanatical members of the Hitler Youth, the Soviet troops soon set fire to the town center, looted inns and liquor stores, and launched an orgy of rape and destruction, triggering a second wave of suicides. Demmin was perhaps an extreme example, but in April and early May similar events were taking place everywhere in the path of the Red Army. Western Germany also had a number of suicides but they were mainly Nazi politicians and their families.



Huber describes one situation: “On 20 April 1945, Adolf Hitler's birthday, 21-year-old Friederike Grensemann said goodbye to her father, who had been called up to the *Volkssturm*, the ‘People's Storm’, a hastily assembled, motley crew of men who had up to this point been excused from military service. A last-ditch attempt to shore up the Third Reich in the face of allied invasions on all sides, it was neither properly uniformed nor adequately equipped. Most of those who served in

it were doomed to failure, and they knew it. As her father left the house, he turned to his daughter and handed her his pistol. 'It's all over, child,' he said. 'Promise me you'll shoot yourself when the Russians come, otherwise I won't have another moment's peace.' He told her to put the barrel in her mouth and pull the trigger. Then he left. Ten days later, as she saw the first Red Army soldiers walking down the street, she took the weapon out, released the safety catch and pressed the barrel into her mouth as instructed. Looking out into the backyard, however, she saw a rubbish bin full of discarded weapons. Maybe the Russians wouldn't get her, she thought. Perhaps they weren't as bad as Nazi propaganda had made them out to be. She went down to the rubbish bin and threw the pistol in. She had decided to live."

She was one of the lucky ones. All over the eastern parts of Germany, people killed themselves to avoid being shot or captured by the Red Army troops, who were rampaging through the region looting, raping and killing. This was a suicide wave on a gigantic scale, people ending their lives in myriad ways. An estimated 10,000 women in Berlin alone took their own lives after being raped by Red Army soldiers. Many more killed themselves, as Gensemann had contemplated doing, in anticipation of the Soviet troops' brutal revenge on the Germans for the millions of deaths inflicted by Hitler's armies on their own population. Often a father would kill his entire family before taking his own life.

But fear of the Soviet troops, or, for women, shame and despair after being raped by them, were not the only reasons Germans killed themselves in what was undoubtedly one of the greatest mass suicides in history. Huber also notes the many suicides of committed members of the Nazi elite, starting of course with Hitler himself, and encompassing not only his immediate subordinates such as Goebbels and Martin Bormann but also government ministers, *gauleiters* (district officials), army generals (53 of them), SS officers and hundreds more. It was not so much fear that drove them as despair and disorientation – the movement that had given their lives meaning and purpose was crashing into ruins around them. The French sociologist Émile Durkheim, in his classic study of suicide, called this phenomenon "*anomie*", the loss of a framework of values that left people without any sense of a moral basis, however warped, for their lives. As Magda Goebbels, who killed her six children before she and her husband killed themselves, wrote: "The world that will come after the Führer and National Socialism won't be worth living in, so I have taken the children with me."

Richard J. Evans reviewing for **The Guardian** writes: "Huber does not make it clear enough that many leading Nazis saw the act of self-destruction as a message, demonstrating to future generations of Germans their willingness to sacrifice themselves for a cause they believed was certain to be resurrected. Like the Romans of old, they were dying an honorable death, rather than face ignominy and humiliation at the hands of the victorious allies. The head of the SS, Heinrich Himmler, took cyanide when he was captured by the British, while the "second man in the Third Reich", Hermann Goering, killed himself after being condemned to death by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg to avoid undergoing the dishonoring ritual of hanging. All of these beliefs were utter illusions, of course: the Nazi party never did revive, and those who had led or served it have earned nothing but scorn and contempt from subsequent generations of Germans."

Evans credits Huber for "tell(ing) the shocking stories of ordinary German suicides with literary power and skill, making excellent use of unknown material in the admirable, privately run German Diary Archive at Emmendingen, in south-western Germany. But after the first 130 pages or so, the book comes badly unstuck. Instead of setting these stories more deeply in their context, and exploring the less immediate factors that lay behind Germans' decision whether or not to kill themselves, such as religion, gender, age, generation, political beliefs and so on – factors that determined the widely varying incidence of suicide between different groups of people – he launches into more than 100 pages of a banal, unvarying narrative of the Nazi years. This is designed to show 'the Germans'

unbounded admiration for Hitler' and their happiness and fulfillment under his rule. Only in this way, he says, can we understand why so many of them killed themselves when the dream fell so spectacularly into ruins."

Evans continues: "If this was really the case, then why weren't there more German suicides, especially in the western parts of the country, which was overrun not by the Red Army but by the western allies? Just as significant, he paints a portrait of an entire nation seduced by Hitler and overwhelmed at the end of the war by 'complicity, culpability, guilt' and fear of the victors' revenge. This is not only seriously inaccurate – millions of Germans were longing for the end of the ruinous regime of the Nazis by

the last months of the war – but also seems designed to let the Germans, or those who supported the Nazis, off the hook by portraying them as innocents who were seduced by a charismatic leader and paid for it with their lives. In the end, this is another narrative of Germans between 1933 and 1945 as victims; which is perhaps why this book has been a bestseller in Germany."

What Evans fails to realize is that many Germans rightfully saw themselves as victims as

their 1935 euphoria turned in the despair of 1945. There was little that they could do to stop the excesses of the Nazis internally without being killed by other German Nazis. Even when Japan lost the war, ritual suicides were expected in the military but civilian suicides were rare. When the South lost the American Civil War I have found no record or studies of willful termination of life after being defeated. What I did find interesting is that both Japan and Germany immediately banned public display of the Rising Sun flag and the Swastika flag in their country. In America it took almost 150 years to find that odious Stars and Bars flag an insult to our nation. I wonder how long a German citizen would have lasted if they claimed that their Nazi heritage was being denied if they continued to fly their flag?

In all fairness to Richard Evans, fellow Englishman, historian Christian Goeschel's **Suicide in Nazi Germany**, published by Oxford University Press in 2009, and translated into German two years later, covers much of the same ground as Huber and does so with proper attention to the many and varied factors that lay behind the wave of self-destruction at the end of the war. Among the many noteworthy features of Goeschel's fine book is its painstaking compilation of statistics, on which Huber seems to have drawn without proper acknowledgment. One of Goeschel's chapters, on the suicides of Jews in Germany between 1933 and 1945, points to an egregious omission from Huber's book. After all, they were Germans too. A seemingly trite but typical English comment.



The Good Old Boy Network

I always wondered why the United States Navy's Bureau of Ordnance (BuOrd) was reluctant to investigate the complaints they had been receiving about the ineffectiveness of the Mark 14 torpedo. BuOrd was a large, monolithic bureaucracy within the Navy that answered to virtually no one other than acts of Congress. Ian W. Toll in the third book of his WWII trilogy, **Twilight of the Gods**, makes a two sentence reference to the Sampson-Scheny controversy while explaining Navy Chief of Operations Admiral Ernest King's reluctance to deal with the American press after Pearl Harbor. King called reporters "ghouls" and did not realize that good public relations are essential to maintaining morale. It took time but King learned that "perception defines reality" and he became more forthcoming in the latter days of 1942. After reading Toll it was just a matter of extrapolating the information and connecting the dots to find a possible cause. A cursory research then presented an explanation why BuOrd was not forced to weigh-in more expeditiously on the torpedo problem. To further understand the Navy's thinking one must first be familiar with the controversy and all of its attendants while heeding the caveat issued by then Navy Secretary John Davis Long *forbidding all officers on active duty to discuss the issue* in November 1899.

The Sampson-Schley Controversy grew out of differences of opinion over who should get credit for the July 3, 1898, victory of the American fleet in the Battle of Santiago de Cuba. Acting rear admiral William T. Sampson was in charge of the American naval force blockading the Cuban port of Santiago, but he did not anticipate that Spanish rear admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete's squadron would sortie. Sampson was en route to a conference with V Corps commander Major General William Shafter when the Spanish fleet emerged from the port.

Commodore Winfield Scott Schley was the ranking officer in the blockading squadron in the absence of Sampson and hoisted a signal for all ships to engage the Spanish. But the ships on blockade duty moved to attack the Spanish vessels on their own. At the sound of gunfire, Sampson's ship, the armored cruiser *New York*, turned back to rejoin the fleet but did not arrive until the end of the battle.

Although Sampson claimed credit for the victory in his report to the Secretary of the Navy, most newspaper reports gave Schley credit for the victory. Alfred T. Mahan argued that victory was due to Sampson's placement of the blockading force and that he deserved the praise.

After the battle, Sampson wrote a confidential report to Secretary of the Navy John D. Long that criticized Schley's actions in the weeks before the battle. When this report became known later, Schley's supporters accused Sampson of duplicity. These supporters grew resentful after both men were promoted to the permanent rank of rear admiral, but Sampson was advanced eight places on the navy list, while Schley was advanced six. Before the war when both were captains, Schley was senior by one. Now, as admirals, Schley was junior by one.

By this time, the Sampson-Schley Controversy was in full bloom, with newspapers, magazines, and individuals in and out of uniform offering their own views. Sampson and Schley did not participate in the dialogues. In November 1899, Secretary Long issued an order forbidding all officers on active duty to discuss the issue.

The supporters of Sampson eventually forced Schley to ask for a court of inquiry in 1901. The court held that Sampson's conduct was not under review, so only testimony directly concerning Schley was admitted. Schley's lawyer unsuccessfully argued that this was unfair because the actions of both officers were related. Sampson wanted to testify, but his health would not permit it. The court was critical of Schley's conduct prior to June 1, 1898, but said that he was self-possessed and encouraged others during the battle. President of the court Admiral George Dewey issued a separate opinion that

dissented from five points at issue prior to the battle. In Dewey's view, Schley was in absolute command and was entitled to the credit for the victory. Many Americans agreed with Dewey. A number of organizations presented gifts of appreciation to Schley.

Sampson, Schley, and Dewey were all dissatisfied for various reasons. Schley appealed to President Theodore Roosevelt for relief from the findings of the court. After studying the record and interviewing the surviving captains in the battle, Roosevelt said that most of the actions that the court censured took place before the battle. He argued that if these actions were censurable, Schley should not have been left in command. Therefore, his shortcomings were in effect condoned by Sampson. As for Santiago, neither Sampson nor Schley exercised command; it was a captain's battle. Roosevelt gave credit to Schley and the captain of his ship for their excellent record in the conflict except for a controversial loop of the ship at the start of the battle. Roosevelt concluded that there was no excuse for keeping this controversy alive. By 1917, the major participants had died, and the matter subsided. But the issues continue to be refought by historians and others almost any time the campaign in Cuba during the Spanish- American War is discussed. The controversy did a great deal of harm to the reputations of Sampson and Schley as well as to other naval officers and administrators.

Almost all Navy admirals and top-half captains were Annapolis graduates (I don't believe there was a mustang among them). They all knew each other and had similar experiences. Admiral Leahy, USNA 1897, was FDR's Chief of Staff during WWII and the former head of BuOrd (1927-31). In 1898 he was an officer on the *USS Oregon* at the Battle of Santiago de Cuba. Serving on the same ship was future Admiral Joseph Reeves, USNA 1894. Future admirals King USNA 1901, Halsey USNA 1904, Nimitz and Furlong (future BuOrd chief) USNA 1905, Spruance USNA 1906, English USNA 1911, and Lockwood USNA 1912 were aware of the controversy and learned that disputes within the Navy should never be made public. So when Captain Ralph Waldo Christie USNA 1915 with an MIT masters (1922) finished developing the Mark 6 fuze for the Mark 14 torpedo there were not any funds available to test the efficacy of this new weapon. Torpedoes were sophisticated and expensive. The cost of a torpedo in 1931 was about \$10,000 (equivalent to \$170,000 in 2020). The development of the Mark 13, Mark 14 and Mark 15 torpedoes was done frugally. The Navy did not want to do live fire tests that would destroy a \$10,000 torpedo. The Navy was also reluctant to supply target ships. Component testing was unheard of.

Chief of Naval Operations William V. Pratt offered the hulk of Cassin-class destroyer *Ericsson*, but prohibited the use of a live warhead, and insisted BuOrd pay the cost of re-floating her if she was hit in error. These were strange restrictions, as *Ericsson* was due to be scrapped. BuOrd declined. A service manual for the Mark 6 exploder was written—but, for security reasons, not printed—and locked in a safe. Consequently, there were no live-fire tests, and the designers had to rely on their judgment. Sadly, that judgment sometimes led to problems: a contact exploder that worked reliably at 30 knots failed at 46 knots. In addition, the Navy had limited experience in using torpedoes in combat. Even when Admiral William Leahy was head of BuOrd (1927-31) he failed to see the purpose of destroying a \$10,000 weapon to see if it worked. When problems were reported BuOrd dragged their feet about assessing the situation, if there was a problem, it lay within the crews and commanders of the submarines rather than the torpedoes. It took a while to get definitive solutions even when problems were proven. For two years, submarines went on patrols with faulty weapons that could swim right under the target, pierce it without detonating, or even sink their own submarine.

Admiral Robert English was the commander of the Pacific Submarine Force who died in a plane crash January 21, 1943. He sided with BuOrd for Captain Christie was his protege. Nimitz selected Admiral Lockwood to replace him. Lockwood was persistent and managed to convince the Navy to reexamine their torpedo. The war lasted 45 months, the first 21 months, almost half our submarines were practically useless. Good fish were issued in September, 1943.