



October 14, 2024

“All men dream, but not equally. Those who dream by night in the dusty recesses of their minds, wake in the day to find that it was vanity; but the dreamers of the day are dangerous men, for they may act on their dreams with open eyes, to make them possible.” T.E. Lawrence

“If everyone is thinking alike, then somebody isn't thinking; Give me an Army of West Point graduates and I'll win a battle... give me a handful of Texas Aggies and I'll win a war; Never tell people how to do things, tell them what to do and they will surprise you with their ingenuity; It is foolish and wrong to mourn the men who died, rather we should thank God that such men lived; Better to fight for something than live for nothing.” Statements from General George S Patton

“There are three types of leaders: Those who make things happen; those that watch things happen; and those who wonder what happened?” American military saying

Our speaker this month is the esteemed James Smither, PhD, history professor at GVSU and Director of its Veterans History Project. He will talk about the book he's working on, which relates to the campaign around Fire support base Ripcord in 1970, located in the A Shau Valley, Vietnam.

MEETINGS take place the second Monday of every month at the **Downtown Holiday Inn**, 310 Pearl NW, Grand Rapids, MI 49504 (616) 235-7611. Socializing begins at 6:00 (1800 hrs), dinner at 7:00 (1900 hrs), business meeting 7:15 (1915 hrs), and program at 8:00 (2000 hrs). Ample free parking available

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NOTE

Our November meeting be our OPEN MESS, Saturday, November 9, 2024 at Boulder Creek Golf Club. There will be a Vegetarian option available. If you have not received an invitation with an accompanied reservation form please contact me immediately.

Our December, January and February meetings will start at 1130 AM., lunch at 1230, followed by a speaker.

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The Comanche Wars (1706-1875)

Throughout history many indigenous populations were eradicated or assimilated by forces that desired either their land, their natural resources or their people (for use as slaves or to replace their own dwindling members). Their struggles were noteworthy in the means used to combat their enemies. In North America the Eastern Indian tribes were usually too numerous and fragmented to stave off attempts from a single source that was determined to destroy them. If the six tribes that inhabited present day New York State and parts of Ontario had organized into the Iroquois Nation 20 years earlier they may have dramatically changed the early outcome of the English settlement of our country. Topic for a future article.

The most powerful and warlike Native American tribes that resisted conquest were the Comanches. In the 18th and 19th centuries, Comanches lived in most of present-day northwestern Texas and adjacent areas in eastern New Mexico, southeastern Colorado, southwestern Kansas, and western Oklahoma. Spanish colonists and later Mexicans called their historical territory Comanchería. During this period they practiced a nomadic horse culture and hunted, particularly bison. They traded with neighboring Native American peoples, and Spanish, French, and American colonists and settlers.

As European Americans encroached on their territory, the Comanche waged war on the settlers and raided their settlements, as well as those of neighboring Native American tribes. They took with them captives from other tribes during warfare, using them as slaves, selling them to the Spanish and (later) to Mexican settlers, or adopting them into their tribe. Thousands of captives from raids on Spanish, Mexican, and American settlers were assimilated into Comanche society. At their peak, the Comanche language was the lingua franca of the Great Plains region.

The seemingly unstoppable Spanish conquest of the Americas annihilated vast empires with populations in the millions, so who would have expected a small Native American tribe with a population in the tens of thousands standing strong, like a bulwark against the relentless tide of European colonial expansion into North America. But this mobile tribe fought the Spanish, Mexicans, Texans and Anglo-Americans to a stand still for hundreds of years.

Spanish expansion into Comanche territory in the 1700s accompanied by the spread of Christianity and disease was the catalyst that ignited 170 years of ferocious Comanche warfare against the Europeans, that would throw back Spanish expansion and reverse the European settlers westward invasion of native American lands. The Spanish inadvertently created their worst nightmare when they introduced hardy Mustang horses to the plains of North America, transforming the hunter gather Comanche tribe into the finest light cavalry in the world.

The Comanche, Apache, Sioux, Crow, Blackfoot and Cheyenne tribes of the Plains, were a totally different kettle of fish to the other Native American tribal groups, these were the great Horse Tribes and they were intensely warlike. Plains warfare was brutal, reminiscent to that waged on the great grasslands of the Mongolian and Khazak Steppes. These nomadic horse tribes, especially the Comanche, were regarded as the greatest horsemen in the world and this inherent ability coupled with their traditional warlike cultures and the vast grassland sea of the Plains created a perfect storm — one where uncounted thousands of Europeans would die. "No tribe in the history of the Spanish, French, Mexican, Texan and American occupation of this land had ever caused so much havoc and death. None was even a close second." — S.C. Gwynne, in his masterpiece: **Empire of the Summer Moon, Rise and Fall of the Comanches**. Having read this book I cannot recommend it enough, a fascinating read and an invaluable account of the protracted clashes between Plains Natives and Europeans, that has been all but erased from the history books.



When the Spanish invaded Comanche lands, they were brutally slapped around and never returned, then the Mexicans came along and became the whipping boys of the Plains Horse tribes with the Comanches and Apaches raiding deep into Mexico, these raids were frequent and all but unstoppable, then briefly the French turned up and were quickly sent packing, then Texan settlers who dared to encroach on Comancheria (the land of the Lords of the Plains) were butchered in staggering numbers for decades, then came the early Texas Rangers who died in unbelievable numbers that were never accurately recorded; most rangers were dead within two months after joining.

Then came the naive and optimistic settlers of the United States of America, who foolishly thought they could just continue settling the traditional lands of these Natives, like those in the east, they were wrong and died painfully. While the phenomenal dominance of the Comanche on the great Plains has been all but forgotten, most have heard the tales of settler families butchered and scalped, they conveniently ignore the Comanche villages massacred by vengeful Europeans.

Basically, the Comanche were like the nomadic horse tribes of the Steppes which had terrorized European and Asian civilizations for centuries, unequalled horse archers and raiders all too happy to pilfer civilized Europeans of their dignity and pride. Interestingly, the Comanche managed to weather the European diseases and overcome the massive technological advantages of their enemies with skill. Frequently, the Europeans attempted to battle the Comanche with conventional military doctrine of the day, line infantry against mounted horse archers, these engagements in the open field didn't go very well, unsurprisingly.

Destruction of the buffalo herds and territory loss forced most Comanches onto reservations in Indian Territory by the late 1870s. In the 21st century, the Comanche Nation has 17,000 members, around 7,000 of whom reside in tribal jurisdictional areas around Lawton, Fort Sill, and the surrounding areas of southwestern Oklahoma.

'Silence Patton': First Victim of the Cold War

Nearly 70 years after the untimely death of U.S. General George S. Patton, suspicions linger as to the nature and circumstances surrounding the demise of this formidable military genius. On a war-torn, two-lane highway in Mannheim, Germany, Patton's car was struck on December 21, 1945 by a two-ton Army truck less than six months after the end of WWII hostilities in Europe. The accident left Patton clinging to life in a Heidelberg hospital during a crucial period when the Allies were attempting to transition from the ravages of war to a sustained peace in Germany. Within three weeks, Patton would lose his final battle, and the fate of post-war Germany would be sealed for several decades.

At the time of his death, Patton had been relegated to a desk job, overseeing the collection of Army records in Bavaria. That he had been an outspoken critic of Stalin and a vocal proponent of liberating Berlin and the German people from certain communist aggression triggered his sudden removal from the battlefield. In the aftermath of war, the Western powers sought to sideline the mercurial Patton and his incendiary views. But Patton despised the politically driven circus and the media minions that carried out their dirty work. Still, he continued to speak out against the Russians as an American witness to their brutality during and after the war. As Stalin devoured Eastern Europe, Patton remarked, "I have no particular desire to understand them except to ascertain how much lead or iron it takes to kill them... the Russian has no regard for human life and they are all out sons-of-bitches, barbarians, and chronic drunks."

In early May 1945, as the Allies shut down the Nazi war machine, Patton stood with his massive 3rd Army on the outskirts of Prague in a potential face off with the Red Army. He pleaded for General Eisenhower's green light to advance and capture the city for the Allies, which also would have meant containment of the Russians. British Prime Minister Churchill also thought the move a crucial and

beneficial one for post-war Europe and insisted upon it, but to no avail. Eisenhower denied Patton's request, and the Russians took the region, which would pay dearly for years to come. Earlier that year, at the February conference in Yalta, President Roosevelt, with Churchill at his side, extended the hand of friendship to "Uncle Joe" Stalin and signed his Faustian pact. In so doing, the destiny of millions was reduced to mass starvation, blood revenge, and distant gulags. At the time, Patton understood the tragedy of this event and wrote, "We promised the Europeans freedom. It would be worse than dishonorable not to see that they have it. This might mean war with the Russians, but what of it?"

Berlin also was given to Stalin's Army as red meat to feed the dictator's appetite for killing Germans. To some, including Patton, this was an unnecessary and devastating concession. In late April 1945, Patton claimed he could take Berlin in just "two days," an assessment shared by the commander of the 9th Army, General William H. Simpson. As with Prague, Patton's request to secure Berlin was denied. Sadly, after Patton finally reached the ravaged city, he wrote his wife on July 21, 1945, "for the



first week after they took it (Berlin), all women who ran were shot and those who did not were raped. I could have taken it (instead of the Soviets) had I been allowed."

Conventional wisdom holds that Eisenhower's choice not to capture the eastern capital cities was sober decision-making or that he was bound by the Yalta agreements, though he originally planned for Berlin and Prague. Many would argue that in the spring of 1945 the U.S. was fatigued with war and its military was in no condition to fight World War III. The Americans also needed the Russians to join the fight in the Pacific war, though the Russians never fulfilled that promise. Yet, the "what ifs" of history echo in Patton's words: *The American Army as it now exists could beat the Russians with the greatest of ease, because, while the Russians have good infantry, they are lacking in artillery, air, tanks, and in the knowledge of the use of the combined arms, whereas we excel in all three of these.*

Moreover, Patton's notion of meeting the enemy "now, rather than later" in retrospect seems not the mere wiles of a warmonger unable to embrace peacetime, but rather a worthy and prudent strategy of a seasoned tactician, even if a gamble. Stalin's own records prove that he told his leaders to "play down" the Berlin invasion, aware that it was Europe's crown jewel. Eisenhower, for all his discernment and skill at war management, did not see the Russians coming as did Patton and Churchill, who both recognized the wisdom of stopping Stalin in his tracks and perhaps offering Eastern Europe a chance at liberation.

Stalin had promised to liberate the capitals of Eastern Europe -- Berlin, Prague, and Vienna -- as well as Eastern Poland and the Baltic states. In his public broadcast dating back to November 1943 he promised: *The day is not far off when we will completely liberate the Ukraine, and the White Russia, Leningrad and Kalinin regions from the enemy; we will liberate... the people of the Crimea and Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Moldavia and Karelo-Finnish Republic.* Instead, history proves that Stalin was responsible for the murder and/or starvation of some 40 million Russians and Ukrainians during his reign of terror.

In light of the Red Army's 20th century rampage, with unprecedented carnage and devastation and arguably the darkest time in Western history, was Patton not the sober warrior speaking truth to a political expediency or human fatigue? Was he not correct about Russian post-war intentions? Would not his attempt to push back his future foes and prevent further genocide have been worth the risk of another battle to secure the eastern capitals? We know the answer now, but Patton knew the answer then.

By the end of the war Patton was defeated. As Eisenhower prepared for the political stage, every misspoken or emotionally charged word uttered by his greatest fighting general threatened to undermine Eisenhower's credibility and authority, as well as the progress of a post-war order. Patton's outspoken and unsolicited opinions, coupled with his unwillingness to punish all German citizens during the de-Nazification period, caused Eisenhower to sideline the general. Patton believed in the righteous cause of the military and revealed his plans to fight those who were destroying its morale and who endangered America's future by not opposing the growing Soviet threat. As a result, he was silenced. He would later say, "when I finish this job, which will be around the first of the year, I shall resign, not retire, because if I retire I will still have a gag in my mouth..."

Never short on words or the courage to deliver them, one wonders what secrets Patton might have revealed to the world had he not met a premature end. His diaries are littered with criticisms of Eisenhower and General Omar Bradley, and at times he found fault with how the war was executed at what he believed was at the expense of American GIs. Were these convictions enough of a threat to put his own life in danger with his peers? Is it plausible that the Russians, weary of his anti-Soviet rhetoric, might have employed the NKVD for the ultimate dirty job?

Article by *Robert Orlando*, Contributor. From the **HUFFPOST**, June 24, 2014, Updated Dec 6, 2017.

COMBINED ARMS

Combined arms is an approach to warfare that seeks to integrate different combat arms of a military to achieve mutually complementary effects—for example, using infantry and armor in an urban environment in which each supports the other. According to the strategist William S. Lind, combined arms can be distinguished from the concept of "supporting arms" as follows: Combined arms hits the enemy with two or more arms simultaneously in such a manner that the actions he must take to defend himself from one make him more vulnerable to another. In contrast, supporting arms is hitting the enemy with two or more arms in sequence, or if simultaneously, then in such combination that the actions the enemy must take to defend himself from one also defends himself from the other(s).

Combined arms operations date back to antiquity, where armies would usually field a screen of skirmishers to protect their spearmen during the approach to contact. Especially in the case of the Greek hoplites, however, the focus of military thinking lay almost exclusively on the heavy infantry. In more elaborate situations armies of various nationalities fielded different combinations of light, medium, or heavy infantry, cavalry, chariotry, camelry, elephantry, and artillery (mechanical weapons). Combined arms in this context was how to best use the cooperating units, variously armed with side-arms, spears, or missile weapons in order to coordinate an attack to disrupt and then destroy the enemy.

Philip II of Macedon greatly improved upon the limited combined arms tactics of the Greek city-states and combined the newly created Macedonian phalanx with heavy cavalry and other forces. The phalanx would hold the opposing line in place, until the heavy cavalry could smash and break the enemy line by achieving local superiority.

The early Republic Roman Legion was a combined arms force and consisted of five classes of troops. Lightly equipped *velites* acted as skirmishers armed with light javelins. The *hastati* and *principes* formed the main attacking strength of the legion with swords and *pila*, whilst the *triarii* formed the defensive backbone of the legion fighting as spearmen (initially as a denser Greek phalanx and later as a looser spear wall formation) with long spears and large shields. The fifth class of troops were the *equites* (the cavalry), which were used for scouting, pursuit and to guard the flanks.

At the Battle of Hastings (1066) English infantry fighting from behind a shield wall were defeated by a Norman army consisting of archers, foot soldiers (infantry), and mounted knights (cavalry). One of the tactics used by the Normans was to tempt the English to leave the shield wall to attack retreating Norman infantry only to destroy them in the open with cavalry. Likewise Scottish sheltrons – which had been developed to counter the charges by English heavy cavalry, and had been used successfully against English cavalry at the Battle of Stirling Bridge (1297) – were destroyed at the Battle of Falkirk (1298) by English archers acting in concert with mounted knights. Both Hastings and Falkirk showed how combined arms could be used to defeat enemies relying on only one arm. The English victories of Crécy, Poitiers and Agincourt were examples of a simple form of combined arms, with a combination of dismounted knights forming a foundation for formations of English longbowmen. The lightly protected longbowmen could down their French opponents at a distance, whilst the armored men-at-arms could deal with any Frenchmen who made it to the English lines. This is the crux of combined arms: to allow a combination of forces to achieve what would be impossible for its constituent elements to do alone.

Moving ahead hundreds of years the English, always fighting someone, met a formidable foe in some Frenchman, Napoleon Bonaparte. After 25 years of near continuous warfare, the armies that met at the Battle of Waterloo in 1815 were organized in a similar manner – into corps which contained

infantry, cavalry and artillery and used similar combined arms tactics. Within each corps were divisions of infantry or cavalry made up of brigades and an artillery unit. An army would usually also have reserves of all three arms under the direct command of the army commander which could be sent in support of any corps or division of a corps to increase any arm which the army general considered necessary. The great French cavalry charge commanded by Marshal Ney during the battle failed to break Wellington's squares of infantry and Ney's failure to supplement his cavalry with sufficient horse artillery to break the squares open is usually given as a major contributing factor in the failure. It is an example of why generals needed to use combined arms to overcome the tactics used by enemy officers to frustrate an attack by a single arm of an army.

The development of modern combined arms tactics began in the First World War. Early in the Western Front, fighting descended into stagnant trench warfare. Generals on both sides applied conventional military thinking to the new weapons and situations that they faced. In these early stages, tactics typically consisted of heavy artillery barrages followed by massed frontal assaults against well entrenched enemies. These tactics were largely unsuccessful and resulted in large loss of life.

As the war progressed new combined arms tactics were developed, often described then as the "all arms battle." These included direct close artillery fire support for attacking soldiers (the creeping barrage), air support and mutual support of tanks and infantry. One of the first instances of combined arms was the Battle of Cambrai, in which the British used tanks, artillery, infantry, small arms and air power to break through enemy lines. Previously such a battle would have lasted months with many hundreds of thousands of casualties. Co-ordination and planning were the key elements, and the use of combined arms tactics in the Hundred Days Offensive in 1918 allowed the Allied forces to exploit breakthroughs in the enemy trenches, forcing the surrender of the Central Powers. In World War II combined arms was a fundamental part of some operational doctrines like Heinz Guderian's Blitzkrieg, or the Soviet deep battle doctrine, which was based on combining tanks, mobile units (mechanized infantry or cavalry) and infantry, while supported by artillery.

The Vietnam War had a profound influence on the development of the US Army's combined arms doctrine. Due to the very difficult terrain that prevented access to the enemy-held areas of operation, troops were often deployed by air assault. For this reason, US troops in Vietnam saw six times more combat than in preceding wars, due to less time spent on logistic delays. The result: an infantry unit increased in effectiveness by a factor of four for its size, when supported with helicopter-delivered ammunition, food and fuel. In time the US Army in Vietnam also learned to combine helicopter operations and airmobile infantry with the armored and artillery units operating from fire support bases as well as the US brown-water navy and USAF close air support units supporting them. AirLand Battle was the overall conceptual framework that formed the basis of the US Army's European warfighting doctrine from 1982 into the late 1990s. AirLand Battle emphasized close coordination between land forces acting as an aggressively maneuvering defense, and air forces attacking rear-echelon forces feeding those front line enemy forces.

In the 1991 Gulf War, General Schwarzkopf used a mix of strikes by fixed-wing aircraft including carpet bombing and precision bombing in combination with large numbers of strikes by attack helicopters. During the ground assault phase, tanks and other armored fighting vehicles supported by attack aircraft swept over remaining forces. The front line moved forward at upwards of 25-30 mph at the upper limit of the Army's tracked vehicles.

In 2000, the US Army began developing a new set of doctrines intended to use information superiority to wage warfare. Six pieces of equipment were crucial for this: AWACS (for Airborne early warning and control), JSTARS (for Airborne ground surveillance), GPS, VHF SINCGARS (for ground and airborne communications), and ruggedized computers. The mix is supplemented by

satellite photos and passive reception of enemy radio emissions, forward observers with digital target designation, specialized scouting aircraft, anti-artillery radars and gun-laying software for artillery. Based on this doctrine, many US ground vehicles moved across the landscape alone. If they encountered an enemy troop or vehicle concentration, they would assume a defensive posture, lay down as much covering fire as they could, designate the targets for requested air and artillery assets. Within a few minutes, on station aircraft would direct their missions to cover the ground vehicle. Within a half-hour heavy attack forces would concentrate to relieve the isolated vehicle. In an hour and a half the relieved vehicle would be resupplied.

Now back to Patton and May, 1945. Carl Hamilton, a Danish geographer and historian, who sees himself as a generalist and a scientist. He approaches history from a social science and statistical oriented perspective, and most other problems from a geospatial point of view. At a recent symposium he was asked who had the best army in Europe after the fall of Berlin? The previous speaker maintained that if Patton was allowed to attack the Russians as he desired, all of Europe would have flourished under the leadership of the United States. Hamilton countered with “the USSR had a very veteran army, with about 20 million serviceable combat veterans. No one else could combine this level of veterancy with the operational experience, military industry and experience based technology. As is always the case, people will naturally disagree with me, but I will make my case for the Soviet Army’s advantages and then you can make up your mind.

While the Soviet Union came into WWII with a dubious officer corps and many untested generals, it came out with a corps of officers of which many had several years experience, and a general staff and field commanders who had risen to the top through both literal and figurative natural selection. Poor commanders had been removed from command to a large extent, or simply died due to their own incompetence, what was left was a genuinely highly skilled and knowledgeable elite. The Soviet Union also had a very advanced understanding of what truly won great battles, and were the real pioneers in combined arms warfare. I’ll give you this quote from the US manual on Soviet tactics FM 100-2-1: ‘The concept of combined arms is far more comprehensive and formalized in Soviet doctrine. It is the cumulative expression of the principles of military art. Combined arms combat is the primary vehicle for their implementation in operations and tactics. Over the past 60 years, the development of the Soviet combined arms concept has been essentially a doctrinal response to increases in the lethality and mobility of weapons and armies.’

The Soviet combined arms doctrine was theorized in the 1930s and matured during WWII. By 1945 the Soviets were operating with what was the essential maneuver concepts which would last until today. In contrast the US Marine Corp formalized a combined arms doctrine called Marine Air-Ground Task Force in 1963, but only a comprehensive large scale doctrine called AirLand Battle was implemented in 1982.

Doctrinally the Soviets were about 37 years ahead of the US in this regard. The Soviets came out of WW2 with excellent technology in most fields. In artillery they had more and bigger guns than their rivals, and the *Katyusha* was unrivaled in its role. The Soviets had the largest fleet of dedicated close air support aircraft (not repurposed fighters). While the T-34–85 was not the most sophisticated tank of WW2, it was highly available and superior in terms of firepower to other common tanks, additionally the IS-2 had no western counterpart, let alone the IS-3 which would have been practically invulnerable to western guns in most situations. Soviet IS-3s were too late for the assault on Germany, but available in numbers by September 1945.

In the infantry department the Soviets also had excellent weapons being fielded, the SKS and RPD both entered service in the end of WW2, and had the war dragged on a little longer would have been tested in Germany. The RPD was the first intermediate caliber machine gun, the US would field their first such machine gun 40 years later in 1984, the FN Minimi or the M249 SAW. The Soviet

Union's military was of course not without weaknesses. The Soviet surface fleet was close to irrelevant, while its submarine fleet was fairly decent, it would likely not have fared much better against the west than the German fleet did. It also did not have a size to match both the US and UK air force combined, particularly in bombers. Though if we compare merely one to one air forces, the Soviet air force was in fact larger than either one separately.

The Soviet invasion of Manchuria, showed that when fighting an enemy that wasn't as well equipped or skilled as Germany, the Soviets were a true steamroller, while the operation is largely forgotten now, it should not be disregarded in proving that the Soviets were able to make large scale operations. The Red Army defeated 1.2 million Japanese troops in the area with 1.5 million Soviet troops, destroying or capturing over 57% of the entire Japanese force in just 11 days, and capturing roughly 1 million square kilometers of territory. That is 300,000 square kilometers bigger than France, Netherlands and Belgium combined and it was captured 3 times faster than Germany captured those countries in 1940.

So in short, I think the Soviet military had a lot of things going for them after WW2, that isn't to say that the Soviets were in a position to start WWIII and win it, but the question isn't if the Soviets would win a war, it is if it was a good military, and it certainly was."

After the presentations many of the attendees sided with Hamilton and drew parallels with Napoleon and Hitler's attempts to conquer Russia and the problems of long supply lines and the coming winter. We were fortunate that cooler heads prevailed and Patton's desire to fight the Russians was denied. The winter of 1945-46 in Europe turned out to be the coldest in the 20th century.



Soviet IS-3 tanks parading on September, 1945 in the Berlin Victory Parade. Its semi-hemispherical cast turret (resembling that of an upturned soup bowl) became the hallmark of post-war Soviet tanks. This Heavy Tank carried a 122 mm gun and had a crew of four.

Holdomor

Known as the Ukrainian Famine, was a man-made famine in Soviet Ukraine from 1932 to 1933 that killed millions of Ukrainians. Holodomor literally translated from Ukrainian means "death by hunger", "killing by hunger, killing by starvation", or sometimes "murder by hunger or starvation. The Holodomor was part of the wider Soviet famine of 1930–1933 which affected the major grain-producing areas of the Soviet Union. Within the definition of genocide there are two major portions: the mental and the physical elements. The mental element is all about the “Intent to destroy” part or all of a “group” (national, ethnical, racial, religious) whereas the physical element is the labor camps, executions, and starvations that killed millions of Ukrainians. “ The Ukrainian genocide remains largely unknown. After 76 years, the blood of the victims still cries for truth, and the guilt of the perpetrators for exposure”."

A noted agriculturalist commented that “Ukraine was the last place anyone would have expected a famine. Ukraine was known for their various foods and supply. The Ukraine is the richest province of the Russian empire.... The soil is a black loam.... I think I have never seen such deep plowing as these peasants give their ground." who would have thought that in just a matter of time millions of people would die of starvation in Ukraine because of one man's orders.

It was by the rule of Joseph Stalin and the Soviet Union that Ukraine was hit by the famine. As terrible as it is, to this is not the only time the totalitarian rule has caused people to suffer, the most current example being North Korea and Kim Jong Un Totalitarian governments are essentially highly powerful dictatorships, controlling every part of their citizens lives some of the main ones being Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Communist China. These Totalitarian governments force their citizens into corner giving only the bare minimums, and keeping everything else for the state. This full control by the government only furthers the people's need for the government, creating a loop of power in which the government gains all the fruits of the people's labor and crushes all those that oppose them.



Public discussion of the famine was banned in the Soviet Union until the *glasnost* period initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s. Since 2006, the Holodomor has been recognized by Ukraine and 33 other UN member states, the European Parliament, and 35 of the 50 states of the United States as a genocide against the Ukrainian people carried out by the Soviet government. In 2008, the Russian State *Duma* condemned the Soviet regime "that has neglected the lives of people for the achievement of economic and political goals."

This photo shows starved peasants on a street in Kharkiv, 1933. They never forget—it never goes away, it's Ukraine, the flowers on the graves are always fresh.